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ANSELM ON FREE CHOICE AND  
CHARACTER FORMATION
Thomas Williams
Character formation is a central theme in Katherin Rogers’s Freedom and Self-
Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism. According to Rogers, Anselm holds that 
the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating 
their own characters through their free choices. I argue that Anselm has no 
doctrine of character formation. Accordingly, he does not hold the view of 
the purpose of free choice that Rogers attributes to him. Creatures cannot 
bring about justice in themselves, let alone increase it by their own efforts; 
any moral progress is divine gift, not creaturely achievement. I offer an alter-
native account of the purpose of free choice.
Character formation is a central theme in Katherin Rogers’s recent expo-
sition of Anselm in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism. 
According to Rogers, Anselm holds (1) that the purpose of free choice is 
to afford creatures the possibility of creating their own characters through 
their free choices, (2) that choices can be determined by an agent’s char-
acter, and (3) that such character-determined choices are nonetheless free 
if the character that determines them is itself a product of free choices.
All these attributions are mistaken. For Anselm has no doctrine of 
character formation or habituation. Accordingly, he does not hold that the 
purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating their 
own characters through their choices. Likewise, he does not envision the 
possibility that a choice could be determined by an agent’s character, and 
so he has no view about whether such a choice would be free.
After briefly showing that Rogers does indeed attribute all these claims 
to Anselm himself (and not merely to “the Anselmian”), I lay out the tex-
tual and philosophical case against Rogers’s view. I show first that there is 
no text in the philosophical and theological works to support a doctrine of 
character formation in Anselm, and that the vocabulary of character, ha-
bituation, and virtue is almost entirely absent from his works. I then turn 
to broader thematic arguments, showing that the claims about character 
formation that Rogers attributes to Anselm are at odds with what Anselm 
says about both the purpose of free choice and the reason that the good 
angels can no longer sin.
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1. Rogers’s Attributions to Anselm
Rogers very properly distinguishes between what Anselm held and what 
someone inspired by Anselm might hold. As she puts it,
I attempt to cast the discussion in the contemporary idiom and within the 
contemporary literature, and so a new character, the Anselmian, has to be 
introduced. The Anselmian embraces the basic outline initially proposed 
by Anselm, and then attempts to fill it in and build upon it. “Anselm” and 
“Anselm’s” indicate that it is indeed the historical figure whose thought is 
expressed.1
My concern in this paper is to argue that Rogers is mistaken in attributing 
to Anselm the claims that she does, and so I begin by showing that she 
does in fact attribute claims (1)–(3) to Anselm, the historical figure, and 
not merely to the Anselmian.
As for (1), that the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the pos-
sibility of creating their own characters through their free choices, we find 
this attributed to Anselm in several places. For example:
In Anselm’s view the value of free will is that it allows for self-creation.2
For Anselm the whole point of our being able to choose freely is that it be-
stows upon us the objective value of being the sorts of things that can imitate 
God by contributing to the creation of ourselves.3
Anselm proposes libertarianism in defense of the elevated metaphysical sta-
tus of the created agent as a self-creator.4
The central motivation for Anselm’s construction of his libertarian theory is 
to elaborate a view which allows for created agents to self-create.5
As for (2), that choices can be determined by an agent’s character, and 
(3) that such character-determined choices are nonetheless free if the char-
acter that determines them is itself a product of free choices, consider the 
following passages.
Anselm holds that a choice which is determined by the agent’s character 
may be considered a se if the character itself is the product of the agent’s past 
a se choices.6
Anselm’s theory holds that an agent’s responsibility for character-deter-
mined choices may be traceable to his responsibility for his self-formed 
character.7
1Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 2. 
2Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3–4.
3Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 25.
4Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 33.
5Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 209.
6Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 13.
7Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 216.
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She also says that Anselm “assumes the tracing thesis,” which she defines 
as the view “that you may be responsible for your character-determined 
choices if you are responsible for your character.”8
Thus it is clear that Rogers attributes claims (1)–(3) to Anselm himself, 
and not merely to an Anselmian.
2. Anselm Has No Doctrine of Character Formation
Anselm has no doctrine of character formation. But how does one go 
about showing a negative of this sort? It ought to be enough to point out 
that Rogers nowhere cites a text of Anselm that states, entails, presup-
poses, or in any other way indicates a belief in the possibility, let alone 
the importance, of character formation. (For there is no such text for her 
to cite.) But she makes the claim so many times, and it is so central to the 
argument of her book, that denying it seems to call for more argument 
than a one-sentence dismissal. So I begin by showing that the language 
of character, habit, and virtue is almost entirely absent from Anselm’s 
work. I then examine the one virtue-word that is commonly found in 
Anselm—iustitia—and show that it does not refer to a stable state of char-
acter acquired by habituation. Finally, I show that, far from believing in 
character formation, Anselm holds that rectitude of will is frighteningly 
precarious, easily lost (or, rather, thrown away) at any time.
One looks almost entirely in vain in the philosophical and theological 
treatises for the language of character. Mores, for example, is found only 
once:
Let no one, therefore, be in a hurry to plunge into the thicket of divine ques-
tions unless he has first sought in firmness of faith the weight of good char-
acter (morum) and wisdom, lest he should run carelessly and frivolously 
along the many side-roads of sophistries and be snared by some obstinate 
falsehood.9
Virtus is almost always “strength” or “power”; only once does it mean 
“virtue” (that is, a settled disposition or trait of character by which one 
is disposed to act rightly), and even there it appears in a description of a 
mistaken view of free choice:
8Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 217.
9Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi 1 (II:9). (All citations to Anselm’s works are followed by 
a parenthetical reference to the volume and page number of the critical edition (Schmitt, 
Opera Omnia) and all translations are my own.) Virtus in the sense of “virtue” is much more 
common in the prayers and (especially) in the letters, but like Rogers I am concerned with 
Anselm’s explicit theorizing about free choice in his philosophical and theological works. An 
examination of his use of virtue-language in the letters would take us too far afield, and since 
Anselm is not working out philosophical theories about ethics and moral psychology in the 
letters in the way that he does in the treatises, it is fair to say that such an examination would 
not be germane to the project of this paper. Nevertheless, the letters do offer insight into 
Anselm’s ethical thought (as Sandra Visser and I discuss in our chapter on Anselm’s ethics 
in Anselm), and I consider some evidence from the letters below, in the section on “Moral 
Progress in Human Beings.”
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Therefore, since we find some statements in Holy Scripture that appear to 
speak in favor of grace alone, and others that are thought to uphold free 
choice alone apart from grace, there have been certain arrogant people who 
have thought the whole efficacy of the virtues (virtutum) rests in freedom 
of choice alone, and there are many in our own day who have given up all 
hope that free choice is anything at all.10
Habitus is always either the perfect participle of habere or the monastic 
habit, never the settled disposition corresponding to Aristotle’s hexis.
The vocabulary of the cardinal virtues, so common in Augustine, is 
likewise nearly absent from Anselm’s work. Fortitudo for Anselm always 
means “strength,” never “courage.” Prudentia appears three times in the 
philosophical works, once11 with the meaning “good judgment” (not spe-
cially confined to the moral domain) and twice12 as an honorific, “Your 
Prudence,” as one might say “Your Grace” or “Your Reverence.” The 
word temperantia never appears in Anselm.
There is, however, one piece of the classical vocabulary of virtue that is 
central in Anselm’s moral thought: iustitia, justice. What will emerge over 
the course of the rest of the paper is that justice likewise is not a state of 
character in the sense that Rogers envisions. It is acquired not by habitua-
tion but by divine gift; there is nothing anyone can do either to attain it or 
to increase it. Moreover, our possession of justice in this life is precarious, 
easily lost (or, to speak strictly, easily thrown away). Anselmian justice is 
therefore not a firm state of character, second nature, along the lines of an 
Aristotelian hexis. But before I can establish this point more fully, I need 
to examine what Anselm says about the purpose of free choice and about 
why the good angels are no longer able to sin.
3. The Purpose of Free Choice
Rogers is right that the purpose of free choice is to make room for creatures 
to have something from themselves, something that is not owed entirely 
to God. Since this point is not in dispute between us, I will not belabor 
it. Where we differ is in identifying what creatures are said to have from 
themselves through free choice. For Rogers, creatures have their characters 
through themselves; they engage in a kind of self-creation through the free 
choices that shape their characters. For example, she claims that Anselm
is motivated to pioneer this position [libertarianism] by the thought that if 
we human beings (and any other created rational and free agents there may 
be) are to bear any responsibility for what we do and, more importantly, 
for the kind of people we are, then we must be able to make choices which 
truly come from ourselves. He believes, as an entailment of his Christian 
faith, that God made us in His image. And he takes that to include the point 
10Anselm, De concordia 3.1 (II:264). 
11Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi 1 (II:4).
12Anselm, Monologion, epist. ad Lanfrancum (I:5); Anselm, Epistola de sacrificio azimi et 
fermentati, prooem. (II:223).
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that we are remarkable reflections in that we are able to participate in the 
creation of our own characters.13
“The point of freedom is self-creation,” she says elsewhere,14 and “in 
Anselm’s view the value of free will is that it allows for self-creation.”15 
She even goes so far as to say that we “are uniquely in the image of God 
in that, unlike everything else, we can participate in our own creation by 
making ourselves better on our own.”16
But in fact what Anselm says consistently and repeatedly is not that 
we create our characters or make ourselves better (a thoroughly Pelagian 
idea, surely), but rather that we retain or preserve justice. Whatever justice 
we may possess must be received from God, not achieved by our own 
character-building efforts or free choices. As I have argued elsewhere,17 
our choice to preserve justice is our own; it is from ourselves, to use 
Rogers’s preferred formulation. It is from God only in the sense that God 
created the will by which we choose and allowed us the free exercise of 
that power of choice.
By contrast, our having justice is from God. We can speak of a crea-
ture’s giving himself justice, but only in the sense that the creature could 
have thrown justice away and didn’t, not in the sense that the creature 
brought it about that he had, or increased in, justice. Anselm could hardly 
be clearer about this:
the [angel] who stayed put (stetit) in the truth in which he was made did 
not make himself not have justice, although he could have; and thus he both 
gave himself justice and received all this from God. For both angels received 
from God the having of justice, the ability to retain justice, and the ability 
to abandon it. God gave them this last ability so that they could, in a certain 
way, give justice to themselves. For if there was no way in which they were 
able to take away justice from themselves, there was also no way in which 
they were able to give it to themselves.18
In other words, the good angels made themselves just, or gave themselves 
justice, only in the sense that by the exercise of their own God-given 
free choice they retained the justice God had already given them, even 
though they had the power to abandon justice. They did not bring about 
13Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 1. As I have shown elsewhere (Williams, “Review”), 
the association Rogers draws here between our being in the image of God and our having 
free choice—an association frequently made in both Anselm on Freedom (11, 20, 56, 72, 83, 87, 
106–107, 124, 201, 205) and Freedom and Self-Creation (1, 2, 19, 24, 41, 73, 156, 173)—is her own 
invention. On the very rare occasions on which Anselm mentions our bearing the divine 
image (only in Monologion 67–68 and Proslogion 1), he understands that image as consisting 
in the Trinitarian structure and activity of the rational mind, especially when directed to 
remembering, understanding, and loving God.
14Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3.
15Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3–4.
16Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 24 (emphasis in original).
17Williams, “Anselm’s Quiet Radicalism.”
18Anselm, De casu diaboli 18 (I:263).
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in themselves any justice that was not previously present in them, or even 
increase in themselves the justice that was already present. There is there-
fore no sense in which they can be said to form their own characters—let 
alone to make themselves better—through their primal choice of justice 
over advantage.
4. Why the Good Angels Cannot Sin
Rogers is of course correct that the good angels, those who made the 
primal choice for justice over advantage, can no longer sin. But the expla-
nation she offers for their inability to sin is entirely at odds with Anselm’s 
account. According to her, the good angels’ primal choice establishes such 
a firm character in them that they can no longer choose advantage over 
justice; their characters are such that they cannot but choose rightly.19 But 
Anselm says otherwise. To begin with, it is hard to imagine that a single 
choice—and the angels had only a single choice—could so firmly fix one’s 
character. Of course, angelic psychology may, for all we know, be different 
from ours in some relevant way such that for angels, unlike for us, a single 
choice can fix their character firmly and for good. But by reflecting on 
human choice we can see why the primal angelic choice as Anselm de-
scribes it is not one that could fix their characters in that way.
Suppose one afternoon, feeling tempted to fritter away my time in idle-
ness, I choose instead to sit down at the piano and put in a good hour 
of serious practice. That choice might well make it a bit easier for me to 
choose practice over idleness the next time the opportunity arises—this 
is precisely how habits are formed, after all—but it certainly does not so 
fix my character that I can never again choose idleness over practice. But 
although this choice does not fix my character, it does arguably change 
something intrinsic to me. (Otherwise how could it contribute to forming 
my character or establishing a habit?) My motivation to practice, or my 
disposition to choose to practice, is strengthened, if only slightly; my mo-
tivation to fritter my time away, or my disposition to avoid productive 
activity in favor of idleness, is weakened, if (again) only slightly.
Without some such intrinsic change in the agent, there is no improve-
ment in character, whether the improvement is incremental or once-for-all. 
And the key point is that on Anselm’s description of the primal angelic 
choice, there is no such intrinsic change in the good angels. It is telling that 
the word Anselm uses to characterize their primal choice is stetit: the good 
angels stayed put. Nothing intrinsic to them changed as a result of their 
choice: they retained the same motivational structure, the same affectiones, 
that they had before the choice. No desire, no motivation, no disposition 
in them changed even in the slightest. So it makes even less sense in the 
angels’ case to posit complete habituation through a single choice than it 
does in my own case.
19For example, “the good angels forever set their character for good by clinging to the 
justice that God has given them” (Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 217).
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Fortunately there is no need to attribute to Anselm any such theory of 
complete habituation through a single choice. He is quite clear that the 
reason the angels can no longer sin is that God gave them, as a reward for 
their primal choice of justice over advantage, whatever advantage they 
had lacked before that choice:
And so the good angels willed the justice that they had, rather than that 
additional something which they didn’t have. As far as their own will was 
concerned, they lost that good (as it were) for the sake of justice; but they 
received it as a reward for justice, and they remained for ever in secure pos-
session of what they had. Hence, they have progressed so far that they have 
attained everything they could will, and they no longer see what more they 
could will; and because of this they are unable to sin.20
So it is not because of any change intrinsic to their will—because they 
have developed a firm character they didn’t have before—that they can 
no longer sin. They retain exactly the same desires, the same affectiones, 
they had before. Rather, it is because of a change extrinsic to their will: 
God gives them the additional something (illud plus)21 that he had with-
held from them before their primal choice. Given that now, as before, they 
can will only justice and advantage, and there is no longer any advantage 
they lack that they could will in preference to justice, they cannot fail to 
will justice. There is nothing left that they could want or choose unjustly. 
It is God’s gift of complete happiness, not their own free choice and some 
habituation or character formation resulting from that choice, that makes 
them unable to sin.
How, then, are the good angels still free? Anselm’s answer is some-
what perfunctory. In the final chapter of On Freedom of Choice, in which 
Anselm lays out his classification of the varieties of free choice, he says 
that the freedom of the good angels (1) “is made by or received from 
God,” (2) “has rectitude that it preserves,” and indeed (3) “has rectitude 
inseparably.”22 This power meets the definition of freedom of choice as 
the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. One might worry 
whether “for its own sake” is still applicable—either because it is their 
perfect happiness that eliminates the possibility of choosing injustice or 
because they now know, thanks to the example of the fallen angels, that 
disobedience would be punished with the severest unhappiness. Are they 
not then, at least, in part preserving rectitude of will for the sake of main-
taining happiness, rather than (or in addition to) preserving it for the sake 
of rectitude itself?
20Anselm, De casu diaboli 6 (I:243).
21Anselm, De casu diaboli 6 (I:243). Of this “additional something” Anselm says simply, “I 
don’t know what it was. But whatever it might have been, all we need to know is that it was 
something they were able to attain, which they did not receive when they were created, in 
order that they might advance to it by their own merit” (De casu diaboli 6 [I:244]).
22Anselm, De libertate arbitrii 14 (I:226)
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Anselm shrugs off such worries as irrelevant: “So if the good angel 
is said to be no longer able to sin solely because he has this knowledge 
[of the consequences of disobedience], it is perfectly clear that just as 
the knowledge itself, which was acquired by his praiseworthy persever-
ance, is glorious, so also the inability to sin that arises out of that glorious 
knowledge is to his glory.”23 Note that his real interest here is in defending 
the claim that the angel’s inability to sin redounds to the angel’s credit. He 
offers no argument for the claim that the angel’s further actions are free; 
in fact, nowhere in his work does he even state that the acts of angels who 
have been confirmed in goodness are free, let alone offer an argument for 
that claim. Unlike Rogers, Anselm sees nothing of theoretical interest in 
that question.24 He is content with saying that they are praiseworthy for 
their justice.
5. Moral Progress in Human Beings
If Anselm were interested in character formation in the way that Rogers 
maintains, he would certainly not have used the primal angelic choice to 
lay out his theoretical understanding of free choice. The angels have a 
single choice, not a series of choices of the sort by which character can 
be developed. Moreover, the angels who choose justly become unable to 
sin, not because anything has changed in them—not because they have 
developed a certain sort of character—but because something external 
to them changes: God gives them the only aspect of happiness they had 
lacked, and so there is no longer anything they could will unjustly. Finally, 
Anselm is barely interested in the freedom of the angels who have been 
confirmed in goodness; he is far more concerned about their praiseworthi-
ness. The primal angelic choice is thus an astoundingly inept device for 
Anselm to rely on if indeed he is trying to develop the view that Rogers 
attributes to him.25
There is, however, conceptual room for some emphasis on character 
formation when it comes to human beings. For we face many choices over 
a long period of time, and repeated choices of a certain sort form our char-
acters, for good or ill. So to see whether something of Rogers’s thesis can 
be salvaged, I turn to the case of human beings. Unfortunately for Rogers, 
Anselm’s account of human moral development is every bit as inhospi-
table to her reading as his account of the once-for-all angelic choice.
To begin with, far from thinking that a human being in this life could 
possess a firm, reliable good character, Anselm emphasizes that our pos-
session of justice is precarious. Justice is easily lost—or, rather, thrown 
away. We cannot either acquire or develop justice by our own efforts, but 
23Anselm, De casu diaboli 25 (I:272).
24The explanation Sandra Visser and I gave in Anselm, 184, of how an angel confirmed in 
goodness can preserve rectitude “on his own steam” seems a plausible account for Anselm 
to adopt, but it can claim no direct support in the texts of Anselm, who never considers the 
question.
25On this point, see further Visser, “Review.”
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we can at any point lose it by our own negligence. So Anselm warns the 
monks of Saint Werburgh at Chester:
Although we can neither have nor preserve anything except through God, 
it is only as a result of our own negligence that we lose it or fall away from 
it. Quite often this starts with the slightest matters. Our crafty Enemy often 
deceives us by persuading us that not much hangs on such things. But what 
follows is the grave harm of which we read in Scripture: “One who does not 
heed small things falls little by little.”26
Since justice can be so easily lost, the moral life requires exceptional vigi-
lance:
This present life is a journey, and as long as we are alive, we do nothing but 
travel. We are always going either upward or downward: either upward 
toward heaven or downward toward hell. When we do some good work, 
we take one step upward; but when we sin in any way, we take one step 
downward. . . . Now it is important to recognize that one goes downward 
far more quickly and easily than upward. For this reason, in every will and 
in every act Christian men and women ought to pay attention to whether 
they are on the upward or the downward path. Let them wholeheartedly 
embrace those in which they see themselves ascending. But as for those in 
which they recognize the downward path, let them flee and renounce them 
as though they were hell itself.27
This sort of wariness about how easy it is to abandon justice—how readily 
one can fall into sin, how easily even good intentions can become cor-
rupted28—pervades Anselm’s letters. It is not a wariness one would expect 
from someone who believes wholeheartedly in the centrality of character 
formation in the moral life.
Yet I must admit that the passage just quoted cuts both ways. Anselm 
speaks not only of the downward path but also of the upward path; and 
although “one goes downward far more quickly and easily than upward,” 
one can apparently go upward. Perhaps here at least is some hint of char-
acter formation, of moral improvement deriving from repeated good 
choices, in Anselm.
Anselm envisions two different kinds of moral improvement: increase 
in the intensity of justice and increase in the extent of justice. In On the 
Virginal Conception, and On Original Sin 24 Anselm explains what it means 
for one person to be more just than another in terms of intensity:
In fact, someone is more just than another just person only if by his will he 
either pursues or avoids more strongly what he ought to; similarly, someone 
is more unjust than another unjust person only if he either loves or spurns 
more strongly what he ought not.29
26Letter 231 to the monks of the monastery of Saint Werburgh at Chester, ca. 1102 (IV:136–
137), quoting Ecclesiasticus 19:1.
27Letter 420 to Basilia (V:365–366). See also Letters 2, 167, 183, 184, and 403.
28On this see especially Letter 80 to Abbot Paul (III:203–204).
29Anselm, De conceptu virginali 24 (II:167).
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Note that Anselm says here that this is the only way in which one person 
can be more just than another, even though later, in De concordia, he will en-
vision another way: increase in the extent of justice. Note also that, strictly 
speaking, he is telling us how to compare two different people rather than 
a given person at different times. It is, however, a natural extension of his 
thought to suppose that just as Mary is more just than I am now because 
she clings to the good more tenaciously, so too I am more just than I was 
two years ago because I cling to the good more tenaciously. Anselm says 
nothing here about how such an increase in justice comes about.
For that we must turn to the much fuller discussion in De concordia 
3.3–6, where Anselm envisions increase in the extent as well as the inten-
sity of justice. The consistent message of the discussion in De concordia is 
that “no creature has this rectitude of will I have been talking about except 
through God’s grace,”30 whether we are talking about the initial rectitude 
of will that makes someone just or the further rectitude of will that makes 
someone increase in justice. Human beings can preserve or abandon that 
rectitude, but they cannot cause it to increase; increase in justice is gift, not 
achievement.
Accordingly, Anselm says,
just as no one receives rectitude unless grace comes first, no one preserves 
rectitude unless that same grace continues. So even though rectitude is pre-
served through free choice, the preserving of rectitude should not be attrib-
uted to free choice so much as it should be attributed to grace, since free 
choice has and preserves rectitude only through prevenient and subsequent 
grace. Now grace follows upon its previous gift in such a way that, whether 
the grace be great or small, it never ceases to give that gift unless free choice 
wills something else and thereby abandons the rectitude it has received. 
For this rectitude never ceases to be present in the will unless the will wills 
something else that is incompatible with rectitude. For example, someone 
receives the rectitude of willing sobriety and then throws it away by willing 
immoderate pleasure from drinking. When he does this, it is by his own 
will, and therefore by his own fault, that he loses the grace he had received.31
The idea of increase in justice by extent slips in here almost unnoticed: the 
suggestion is that one could have rectitude in some other domain and then 
receive “the rectitude of willing sobriety” as an additional gift (and then, 
of course, throw it away).32 The same idea recurs a little later on, when 
Anselm observes, “Some people, after all, are just in one respect and unjust 
in another: for example, someone who is chaste but envious.”33 Heaven is 
30Anselm, De concordia 3.3 (II:266).
31Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:267–268).
32I owe to Sandra Visser the observation that part of Anselm’s sense of the precariousness 
of justice and the impossibility of something like Aristotelian virtue in this life must have 
arisen from his experiences of seeing monks, good monks, fall into drunkenness and other 
sins. Reading through his letters one sees example after example of monks tempted into 
disobedience and worldliness of various kinds.
33Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:268).
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promised only to those whose justice is unlimited in extent—“those who 
are just without any injustice”34—but Anselm does not elaborate on how 
such complete justification comes about. The point remains, however, that 
any increase in justice in the soul will be a divine gift and not a human 
achievement.
In De concordia 3.6 Anselm takes up an extended discussion of the cul-
tivation of the soul, its growth in holiness through the Holy Spirit.35 If we 
were going to find a doctrine of character formation anywhere in Anselm, 
it would surely be here. But in fact he continues to maintain that all moral 
development is gift. We can pray for an increase in justice, but we pray 
only in virtue of the justice we have already received; and if we indeed 
increase in justice, this will be a matter of grace and not our own doing. 
Thus, Anselm says,
those who say, “Turn us, O God” (Psalm 85:4 [84:5]), have already turned 
to some extent, since they have an upright will when they will to be turned. 
They pray in virtue of what they have already received, in order that their 
turning might be increased, like those who were already believers and said, 
“Increase our faith” (Luke 17:5). It is as if both were saying, “Increase in us 
what you have already given us; bring to completion what you have already 
begun.”36
We do not attain greater justice by our own efforts, but by the increase of 
God’s grace.
6. Conclusion
The central contention of Freedom and Self-Creation is false: Anselm does 
not think that the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the ability 
to form their own characters. Yes, free choice is given to creatures in order 
that they might have something for which they are genuinely responsible, 
something truly “from themselves”; but for Anselm what we have from 
ourselves is not our characters, but our choices. The good angels are un-
able to sin, not because they have developed firm characters through a 
single primal choice, but because of a change external to themselves. An-
selm emphasizes, not that they retain free choice (though he does affirm 
this), but that they are praiseworthy for their inability to sin. (Whether 
their further just choices count as determined in some way is not a ques-
tion I will pursue here, but it does follow trivially that those choices are 
not determined by their characters in Rogers’s sense, and therefore that 
the question whether character-determined choices can be free does not 
arise for Anselm.) As for human beings, whatever justice we possess in 
this earthly pilgrimage is gift, not achievement; we can neither attain it 
34Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:268).
35For Anselm’s pneumatology, see Williams, “God Who Sows the Seed.”
36Anselm, De concordia 3.6 (II:272).
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nor increase it by our own efforts. Such justice, moreover, is not a secure 
possession, an Aristotelian hexis: we can very easily throw it away.37
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